1.According to Dainton, the cardinality of the set of real numbers in the interval [0, 2] is ______ the cardinality of the set of real numbers in the interval [0, 1].
a. greater than
b. less than
c. equal to
d. None of the above

2. According to Dainton, the cardinality of the set of rational numbers is ______ the cardinality of the set of natural numbers.
a. greater than
b. less than
c. equal to
d. None of the above

3. According to Dainton, the cardinality of the set of rational numbers is _______ the cardinality of the set of natural numbers.
a. greater than
b. less than
c. equal to
d. none of the above

4. According to Dainton, Newton held that
a. you have an absolute velocity right now, and there are physical experiments you can carry out to find out what that velocity is.
b. you have an absolute velocity right now, but there are no physical experiments you can carry out to find out what that velocity is.
c. you do not have an absolute velocity right now and, although you do have a (zero or non-zero) absolute acceleration, there are no physical experiments you can carry out to find out what that acceleration is.
d. you do not have either an absolute velocity or a (zero or non-zero) absolute acceleration.

5. According to Dainton, what is the main problem with Leibniz’s argument from indiscernibility against substantivalism?
a. It makes an assumption that those sympathetic to substantivalism will find completely implausible, namely, that all genuine properties are empirically detectable.
b. It relies on PSR, which few philosophers or scientists accept.
c. It relies on PII, which is highly controversial.
d. It begs the question of how relationists such as Leibniz himself could detect the difference between objects absolutely at rest and objects in absolute motion. This raises the question of how even Leibniz could tell the difference between the shifted worlds.
Q: Why is the water concave in the third stage, but not the first stage, of bucket experiment?

6. Suppose that the relationist gave the following answer to Q: “Because the water is rotating, hence accelerating, relative to the sides of the bucket in the third stage but not the first stage.” What, according to Dainton and Dasgupta, would be wrong with that answer?
a. For relationists, the sides of the bucket are accelerating relative to the water, not vice versa, in stage three.
b. Substantivalists can say that the water is accelerating relative to the sides of the bucket in stage three, but relationists cannot say this, since, for them, it is equally true that the sides of the bucket are accelerating relative to the water, in stage three.
c. Relationism is purely a priori doctrine and never invokes empirical evidence, but the above answer depends upon empirical evidence.
d. The water and the bucket are at rest with respect to each other in stage three. They are not rotating relative to each other and are not accelerating with respect to each other, in stage three.

7. Suppose that the relationist gave the following answer to Q: “Because the water is rotating, hence accelerating, relative to the walls, floor, and ceiling of the room, in stage three but not in stage one.” What, according to Dainton and Dasgupta, would be wrong with that answer?
a. The water and the walls, ceiling, etc., are at rest with respect to each other in stage three. They are not rotating relative to each other and are not accelerating with respect to each other, in stage three.
b. For relationists, the walls, ceiling, etc., are accelerating relative to the water, not vice versa, in stage three.
c. Substantivalists can say that the water is accelerating relative to the walls, ceiling, etc., in stage three, but relationists cannot say this, since, for them, it is equally true that the walls, ceiling, etc., are accelerating relative to the water, in stage three.
d. If the experiment were changed, and the walls, ceiling, etc., were made to rotate at the same rate and direction as the bucket at all times, the water would probably still be concave in stage three but not stage one, despite the fact that it would fail to be rotating or accelerating relative to the walls, ceiling, etc, in either stage.
e. Relationism is purely a priori doctrine and never invokes empirical evidence, but the above answer depends upon empirical evidence.

8. According to Dainton and Dasgupta, how would Newton answer Q?
a. Newton would say, “Because the water is rotating, hence accelerating, relative to absolute space in stage three but not in stage one”.
b. Newton would say, “Because the water is rotating relative to the fixed stars in stage three but notin stage one.”
c. Newton would say, “Because the worldlines of the water molecules are curved in stage three but not in stage one.”
d. Newton would say, “Because the water is rotating, hence accelerating, relative to the sides of the bucket in stage three, but not in stage one.”

9. According to Dainton, which of the following is one main difference between Newton’s space + time model (p. 195) and Newtonian spacetime?
a. In Newton’s space + time model, there are instants of time. In Newtonian spacetime, there are no instants of time.
b. In Newton’s space + time model, time is a continuum of instants, which are densely ordered by the earlier than relation. In Newtonian spacetime, instants are not densely ordered by the earlier than relation; rather, each instant, aside from the last, has an immediate successor.
c. In Newton’s space + time model, points of space endure through time. In Newtonian spacetime, enduring points of space are replaced by successions of momentary spacetime points.
d. In Newton’s space + time model, time is infinite in both directions. In Newtonian spacetime, time is finite in duration.

10. Of all the views discussed by Gilmore, Costa, and Calosi (GCC), the one that most closely corresponds to Newton’s space + time model is the view GCC call:
a. The A-theory.
b. Separatism.
c. Presentism.
d. Eternalism.

11. Dainton lists some examples of statements which ‘do not make sense’ in neo-Newtonian (Galilean)spacetime, and he lists other examples that ‘do make sense.’ Given what he means by ‘makes sense in X’, which of the following do not make sense in Galilean spacetime?
(1) Particle A is speeding up (not slowing down, and not retaining a constant velocity) at time t.
(2) Particle A is undergoing a greater acceleration at time t than is particle B at that time. [A spaceship turns on a beacon that flashes once every twenty seconds. Throughout the period that encompasses the first three flashes, the spaceship floats inertially. Between its third and fourth flashes, thespaceship fires its rocket engines and accelerates rapidly.]
(3) The spatial distance between the second and third flashes is less than the spatial distance between the third and fourth flashes.
a. (1), (2), and (3)
b. (1) and (2)
c. (1) and (3)
d. (2) and (3)
e. (1)

12. Given what Dainton means by ‘makes sense in X’, which of (1), (2), and (3) do make sense in Newtonian spacetime?
a. (1), (2), and (3)
b. (1) and (2)
c. (1) and (3)
d. (2) and (3)
e. (1)

13. Suppose that you and I inhabit Minkowski spacetime and are moving toward one another inertially. Suppose that I sneeze, and that relative to my rest frame, my sneeze is simultaneous with – and 90 million miles away from – your cough. Let us idealize and pretend that the cough is confined to a single spacetime point. Likewise for the sneeze. Then, relative to your rest frame, your cough is _______ my sneeze.
a. earlier than
b. later than
c. simultaneous with
d. Not enough information

14. In the above scenario, my sneeze is ________ your cough.
a. timelike separated from
b. lightlike separated from
c. spacelike separated from
d. not enough information

15. In the above scenario, your cough is _______ my sneeze.
a. inside the past lightcone of
b. on the past lightcone of
c. inside the future lightcone of
d. on the future lightcone ofe. in the absolute elsewhere of

16. Assuming that there is no superluminal causal signaling:
a. my sneeze could cause your cough but not vice versa.
b. your cough could cause my sneeze but not vice versa.
c. my sneeze could cause your cough and vice versa.
d. neither could cause the other.

17. Relative to an inertial observer who measures himself as being midway between us the whole time and who measures us as both approaching him with equal speed, my sneeze is _____ your cough.
a. earlier than
b. simultaneous with
c. later than
d. not enough information

18. According to Gilmore, Costa, and Calosi (GCC), the view that the passage of time is objectively real, and that there is a metaphysically privileged present time, is called:
a. The A-theory
b. The B-theory
c. The Block Universe theory
d. Presentism
e. The Growing Block theory

19. According to GCC, the view that time is real, that the past, present and future all exist equally, that some events are objectively earlier than others, but that no time or event is metaphysically privileged, is called:
a. The A-theory
b. The B-theory
c. The Moving Spotlight theory
d. Presentism
e. The Growing Block theory

20. According to GCC, the view that the passage of time is objectively real, and the only entities that exist are present entities, is called:
a. The A-theory
b. The B-theory
c. The Moving Spotlight theory
d. Presentism
e. The Growing Block theory

21. According to GCC, the view that the passage of time is objectively real, that past, present and future all exist equally, that there is one time that is, absolutely speaking, the present time, and that which time has this property changes as time passes, is called:
a. The A-theory
b. The B-theory
c. The Moving Spotlight theory
d. Presentism
e. The Growing Block theory

22. According to GCC, the view that the passage of time is objectively real, that the past and present exist and the future does not, and that reality grows as time passes, is called:
a. The A-theory
b. The B-theory
c. The Moving Spotlight theory
d. Presentism
e. The Growing Block theory

23. According to GCC, the view that space is a three-dimensional entity composed of simple, unextended points that endure through time, that time is a one-dimensional entity composed of simple, temporally unextended instants, and that no instant shares parts with any point of space, is called:
a. Newtonian spacetime
b. Galilean spacetime
c. Aristotelian spacetime
d. Spacetime unitism
e. Separatism about space and time

24. According to GCC, the view that there is just one fundamental spatiotemporal arena (four-dimensional spacetime), that this arena is composed of simple, instantaneous, spatially unextended space time points, that instants, if they exist, are complex entities composed of spacetime points, and that points of space, if they exist, are also complex entities composed of spacetime points, is called:
a. The Growing Block View
b. Eternalism
c. Spacetime unitism
d. Newtonian spacetime
e. Separatism about space and time.

25. According to GCC, the view that the past, present, and future are all equally real is called:
a. The A-theory
b. The B-theory
c. The Moving Spotlight view
d. Eternalism
e. The Growing Block view

26. The view that regions of space or spacetime are real entities in their own right, in no way reducible to objects or events standing in spatiotemporal relations, is called:
a. substantivalism
b. relationism
c. eternalism
d. unitism

27. How might wormholes be used to produce CTCs, according to Dainton?
a. A wormhole by its very nature requires the existence of a CTC
.b. A wormhole connects up with the singularity in the interior of a black hole, which guarantees the existence of a CTC.
c. One mouth of a wormhole could be taken on a high-speed round trip, as in the Twins Paradox situation.
d. None of the above.

28. According to GCC, the shift from STR to GTR might help certain versions of the A-theory. Which version, and why?
a. It might help those versions that take Cauchy-surface-ism to be the correct answer to the Shape Question, because GTR, unlike STR, allows for the possibility that there is a unique, geometrically privileged foliation of spacetime into Cauchy surfaces.
b. It might help the Growing Block Theory, because GTR, unlike STR, entails that spacetime is variable, rather than being permanently fixed. STR entails that spacetime is always the same – it is always Minkowski spacetime – regardless of how matter and energy are distributed. GTR entails that many different overall geometrical characterizations of spacetime are physically possible, and that which one is actual depends in part on how matter and energy are distributed. This allows that spacetime could change, and even grow, as time passes, just as the Growing Block Theory states.
c. It might help those versions that take pointism to be the correct answer to the Shape Question, because GTR, unlike STR, rules out the possibility of spacetimes that can be foliated by a series of Cauchy surfaces, by a series of past light cones, or by a series of ‘bow tie’ regions. Pointism is the only option that remains, once these options are eliminated.
d. It might help the Moving Spotlight Theory, because GTR, unlike STR, makes spacetime a dynamic causal agent in its own right.

29. According to Lockwood (as reported by Gilmore, Costa, and Calosi), what do A-theorists have to fear from black holes?
a. A-theorists are much more likely to fall into them than are B-theorists.
b. If our spacetime contains a black hole, then our spacetime has no foliation into Cauchy surfaces.
c. If our spacetime contains a black hole and has an infinite future, then it has no foliation into Cauchy surfaces.
d. If our spacetime contains a black hole that evaporates before our universe ends, then our spacetime has no CMC foliation.

30. What is Zimmerman’s main objection to the Lorentzian view?
a. It is more scientifically revisionary than it needs to be in order to make room for presentism.
b. It is not empirically adequate; it makes predictions that contradict our observational findings.
c. It is committed to the existence of a privileged slice of spacetime.d. None of the above.

31. Which of the following objections does Zimmerman not raise to the principle ‘if physics can’t see it, it’s not there’?
a. If that principle were true, then even Newtonian physics would conflict with presentism; but almost no one thinks that Newtonian physics conflicts with presentism!
b. Physics can’t see God, but of course God exists.
c. Physics can’t see a distinction of kind between the actual world and various merely possible worlds, but of course there is such a distinction.
d. Physics can’t see a distinction between cases in which some particles compose something and cases in which some particles don’t compose something, but there is such a distinction.

32. Which of the following objections do Gilmore, Costa, and Calosi mention in their discussion of pointism?
a. just as one can be sure of one’s own existence merely by noting that one is currently conscious, one can be sure that reality has at least some temporal duration, merely by noting that one’s current conscious experience has some temporal duration (it’s not instantaneous).
b. It has an even worse truthmaker problem than ordinary presentism
c. it cannot make use of reference frames to relativize tense operators, since frames of reference would not exist if only a single spacetime point existed.
d. Given the link that connects presentness with absolute availability, pointism entails that if your current experience is absolutely available to you, then no experience that is occurring elsewhere is absolutely available to its owner.

33. If ‘STR’ refers to STR-, how should the A-theorist respond to the argument from STR, according to Markosian?
a. The A-theorist should say that, not only is there a relation of absolute simultaneity, but further, it is physically possible to determine which events stand in this relation.
b. The A-theorist should say that even though, given STR, it may not be physically possible to tell which events stand in the relation of absolute simultaneity, it doesn’t follow from this that no two events stand in that relation.
c. The A-theorist should say that STR is not well supported by the observational evidence and in fact is not even true.
d. None of the above.

34. Consider what Wasserman calls the annihilation argument. According to Wasserman, that argument:
a. is sound. It shows that while Wellsian backward time travel may be coherent given eternalism, it is not coherent given presentism. For if presentism is true, then, in the classic cases of Wellsian ‘backward time travel’, the so-called time traveler does not really travel to the past; rather, he or she is merely annihilated.
b. fails to establish any asymmetry between presentism and eternalism regarding time travel. It is equally true for the eternalist that if you push the button, you will never exist again, and so are in some sense annihilated.
c. is sound. It shows that while Wellsian backward time travel may be coherent given presentism, it is not coherent given eternalism. For if eternalism is true, then, in the classic cases of Wellsian ‘backward time travel’, the so-called time traveler does not really travel to the past; rather, he or she is merely annihilated.
d. attempts, but fails, to establish the symmetry of presentism and eternalism. So far as the argument is concerned, presentists still have the upper hand in making sense of cases of Wellsian backward time travel.

35. Suppose that the A-theory and what GCC call Past Cone-ism is true. In that case, which of the following premises from Ney’s argument for Eternalism from Special Relativity is the least plausible?
a. (1) If either presentism or the growing or shrinking block theories are true, then which objects or events are real depends on which are past, present, or future.
b. (2) But which events are past, present, or future depends upon facts about which events are simultaneous with the here and now.
c. (3) If the special theory of relativity is true, then which events are simultaneous with the here and now is a matter of one’s perspective.
d. (4) The special theory of relativity is true.e. (8) But what is real is not a matter of one’s perspective.

36. The speed of light = c. Which spacetimes support absolute, frame-invariant facts such as the following? Particle A is moving at 99% of c.
a. Newtonian spacetime, Galilean spacetime, and Minkowski spacetime.
b. Newtonian spacetime.
c. Newtonian spacetime and Galilean spacetime.
d. Newtonian spacetime and Minkowski spacetime.
e. Minkowski spacetime.

37. Which spacetimes support absolute, frame-invariant facts such as the following? Photon P is moving at c.
a. Newtonian spacetime, Galilean spacetime, and Minkowski spacetime.
b. Newtonian spacetime.
c. Newtonian spacetime and Galilean spacetime.
d. Newtonian spacetime and Minkowski spacetime.
e. Minkowski spacetime

1.According to Dainton, the cardinality of the set of real numbers...